Explanation of Illusions and Delusions

Introduction

Every philosophical tradition grapples with a deceptively simple question: why do we sometimes get reality wrong? In Indian philosophy, this question gave rise to one of the most sophisticated debates in intellectual history. When you see silver gleaming on the ground and reach for it, only to discover it is a piece of shell, something has gone wrong in your cognition. But what exactly went wrong – and where? Is the fault in your perception, your memory, your very consciousness, or in the nature of reality itself?

Khyativada is the collective term for the Indian theories of perceptual error. The word khyati refers to cognition or apprehension, and vada means doctrine or discourse. Together, Khyativada denotes a family of theories concerned with the nature of erroneous perception – what its content is, and what ontological status the illusory object holds. These theories deal specifically with the nature of the object of illusory perception, examining whether error consists in the object itself or in the subject’s act of cognition.

A crucial presupposition underlies all Khyativadas: misperception is not simply a human failure to perceive correctly, but occurs due to peculiar special circumstances – cognitive, metaphysical, or both. Understanding these theories comparatively reveals not just how Indian thinkers explained illusion, but what each school ultimately believed about consciousness, reality, and knowledge.

These are the most well known Khyativadas

1. Akhyati: error as non-apprehension
2. Atmakhyati: the idealist account of error
3. Asatkhyati: error as apprehension of the non-existent
4. Anyathakhyati: error as misapprehension
5. Anirvacaniyakhyati: error as apprehension of the indescribable

Akhyati

Akhyativada was popularized by Prabhakara school of Mimamsa

Imagine you are walking alone in a desert and see something like water at a distance. Since you are very thirsty and also weak, will you run towards it with your feeble legs or conclude it is an illusion or a mirage?

You can substitute a robot in your place like so: Imagine a robot with low battery is looking for a charging station in a desert. At a distance it sees a wavy surface that could be an oasis where a charging station would be available. Will it go toward the what appears to be a oasis but not verified to be true or save its battery charge for an emergency?

Sticking with a human example, Akhyativada analyzes the situtation as follows:

To conclude "this is water" you have 2 gnanas at play.

One is perception: the refraction of sun's rays on hot desert sand giving rise to wavy motion

Second is memory: you have seen water reservoirs, lakes, rivers, etc. with ripples and waves in the past. The play of sun's rays ahead of you, jigs your memory and you retrieve from memory the "waterness" you have experienced earlier.

The gnana about "this" or "light rays" does not contain the gnana of water.

Vice-versa, i.e. the gnana about "water" does not have "light rays" as content.

Therefore, there is non-apprehension. If you choose to act, it is because of superposition of one gnana over the other making you think "this is water", especially when you are very thirsty.

Criticism:

The theory leaves decision to act to the individual faced with an illusion. Unless one has desire, either through past samskaras or when presented with a desirable object, one wouldn't act. If one acts despite being very feeble, it is because the desire to quench the thirst is strong.

Before acting, one has to see the "similarity" with something particular he has known earlier or confirm "non-existence". So non-apprehension, as the theory claims, is not always the case.

The theory assumes that the two gnanas occuring in succession somehow coalesce to give rise to a third gnana resulting in action or inaction.

Other Illusions

The theory assumes that there is no defect in sense organs (indriyas). The defects are causes of obstruction in giving rise to normal effects but not other effects. The example they give to support this claim is "there would be a possibility of a banyan tree sprouting from a defective gunja seed".

Criticism:

When causes are obstructed by a defect to give rise to their normal effects, they acquire the capacity to produce other effects. For example:

• the seeds of bamboo roasted by forest fire produce plantain shoots
• the digestive fire or jatharagni in one who is suffering from a disease called bhasmaka can digest a large quanity of food.

Therefore indriyas can be defective producing erroneous knowledge.

A third example they give is, a jaundiced person sees a conch as yellow because of the disconnect between perception and the gnana about the color of a conch as not yellow or white. Therefore, according to them, all gnanas that are called "doubtful" or "erroneous" are actually valid.

Criticism:

Knowledge has the property of "self-validity". In the case of mirage, an acceptable gnana is "this is probably not water" rather than "water is non-existent".

Criticism:

The theory can't apply to dreams where there is neither perception nor memory.

Criticism:

When someone in delusion or because of diplopia sees two moons, there is no question of a second moon based on memory.

Criticism:

The theory doesn't accept abhava which is negative or counter evidence. Assuming they do, lack of knowledge fails to explain error whether we view knowledge as incomplete or as an entire negation. Most of human knowledge belongs to the former category.

Application

In Gita 4.18:

karmanyakarma yah pashyed akarmani cha karma yah
sa buddhiman manushyeshu sa yuktah kritsna-karma-krit

One who sees akarma (inaction) in karma (action) and karma in akarma is wise. He can be called a yogi. He is the one who has done all karma.

Objection: Isn't it a contradiction? karma can't be akarma and akarma can't be karma.

Sankara: Fools claim action where there is none and vice-versa. [One thinks: "I am the doer. I have done my duty. I will enjoy the fruit of my karma." Sankara says he is mistakenly attributing karma to atma that is in vedanta only a witness. Similarly one who thinks: "I will remain idle. I don't have anxiety. I will live happily" is (in thought) doing karma when in reality his in inaction] Whereas a wise one sees action in inaction, vice-versa. Hence Lord wants us look at the one that has reality. He wants us to attain salvation by recognizing what is real. There is no liberation by pursuing unreal.

Like berries in a pot, there is no support for karma in the form of akarma. vice-versa. Ignorant ones are looking at karma and akarma like water in a mirage or silver in a shell.

Objection: karma is same for all.

Sankara:No. One who is riding on a boat on a river sees the trees on the banks as moving but not stars in the sky. In the same manner one who claims atma (that never does any karma) has done karma and one who thinks "I am not the doer", both are ignorant. The Lord wants to dispel this nescience.